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Providing a mechanism to authenticate users in healthcare applications is an essential security requirement to prevent both
external and internal attackers from penetrating patients’ identities and revealing their health data. Many schemes have been
developed to provide authenticationmechanisms to ensure that only legitimate users are authorised to connect, but these schemes
still suffer from vulnerable security. Various attacks expose patients’ data for malicious tampering or destruction. Transferring
health-related data and information between users and the health centre makes them exposed to penetration by adversaries as
they may move through an insecure channel. In addition, previous mechanisms have suffered from the poor protection of users’
authentication information. To ensure the protection of patients’ information and data, we propose a scheme that authenticates
users based on the information of both the device and the legitimate user. In this paper, we propose a Robust Authentication
Model for Healthcare Users (RAMHU) that provides mutual authentication between the server and clients.This model utilizes an
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) and PHOTON to achieve strong security and good overall performance.
RAMHU relies on multiple-pseudonym, physical address, and one-time password mechanisms to authenticate legitimate users.
Moreover, extensive informal and formal security analysis with the automated validation of Internet security protocols and
applications (AVISPA) tool demonstrate that our model offers a high level of security in repelling a wide variety of possible
attacks.
1. Introduction
A lack of security and confidentiality of information and data
used by healthcare (HC) applications remains the main prob-
lem that limits the wide spread of these applications. These
systems require a robust security mechanism to authenticate
HC users for achieving the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (CIA) triangle [1, 2] and the compliance with
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPPA) and Health Level Seven (HL7) standards to protect
data from being tampered with and altered [3]. Security
requirements (CIA) should be implemented when exchang-
ing data between a client (patient or provider) application
and a server application, as any modification to this data
affects both medical decisions and the patient’s condition [4].
Authentication is the first as well as the most critical security
requirement that plays a key role in building correct security
before the exchange of patients’ data in HC applications [4–
7]. On one hand, authentication can reduce malicious or
fatal errors caused by penetration attacks on the authenti-
cation information. On the other hand, it alleviates errors
in specifying the drug, dose, timing, or procedure [8]. As
a result, authentication protocols are a critical requirement
to repel various attacks. Typically, the server application
should prevent all fake and illegal authentication requests
[9, 10]. It should protect personal information, health records,
and physiological parameters (such as sugar and heart rate)
[4, 11]. However, authentication information may be easier
to compromise if data and information are stored on a
single server. Furthermore, the transfer of authentication
information in an insecure environment (wireless local area
network (WLAN) or Internet) may expose patients’ data for
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detection or modification [6, 12]. Some of the recent cases of
security threats on HC applications are presented as follows:
(i) Penetration attacks on HC data in the United States’
hospitals occurred (2013). These attacks revealed
85.4% of the protected health information (PHI) of
the 5 largest incidents for patients’ records [13]
(ii) Apple Health (Medicaid) was exposed to data breach
(2016). This attack revealed 370,000 records of users
(Washington state) [14]
(iii) An unauthenticated user penetrated the electronic
health record (EHR) containing 14,633 records in
the New Jersey Diamond Institute for Fertility and
Menopause (2017) [15]
The traditional cryptography (such as Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA)) and signature (such as secure hash
algorithm-1 (SHA-1)) schemes require complex computations
that consume server resources such as processing power
and memory to deal with large amounts of health data
in HC applications [16] and, thus, which could render
them unusable. The electronic signature is used to check
the integrity of the users’ information in the authentication
request [17].Many lightweight algorithms, such as PHOTON,
QUARK, and SPONGENT, are desired to implement
electronic signatures that perform lightweight operations
to reduce high overheads on the server. HC applications
require cryptographic and signature high-speed and secure
algorithms [18]. To implement an authentication scheme,
many algorithms, such as the Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC), RSA, hash function, bilinear pairing, fuzzy extractor,
and XOR operation [19], are used in HC application
projects. Many recent HC applications are based on ECC
and RSA, both of which provide the same security level,
although ECC is more efficient than RSA. The design of an
authentication protocol in HC applications should provide
mutual authentication, resistance to known attacks such
as man-in-the-middle (MITM), eavesdropping, tracing,
replay, impersonation, guessing, and denial-of-service (DoS)
[20], protection of information, and reduced cost and high
efficiency [21, 22].
1.1. Our Contributions. We propose a Robust Authentication
Model for HC Users (RAMHU) for HC applications that
perform massive and continuous authentication processes
while simultaneously protecting against various attacks. Our
contributions include providing robust authentication for
legitimate users in the HC applications and access the server
repository. They are summarised as follows:
(i) RAMHU uses lightweight algorithms for encryption
(ECIES) and signature (PHOTON).These algorithms
provide efficient and secure authentication for users
in HC applications compared to other algorithms
(ii) RAMHU applies a one-time password (OTP) mech-
anism to authenticate users in their first registration
in the HC network with timestamp verification and
random nonce generation to repel different types of
external attacks
(iii) RAMHU uses a multiple-pseudonym mechanism to
prevent any association between the real information,
pseudonyms, and user’s data. This mechanism pre-
vents attackers from identifying HC users (providers
and patients)
(iv) RAMHU integrates login request with media access
control (MAC) address in addition to verifying that
this address is original and not fake for authentication
of legitimate devices. This prevents attackers from
using different devices to compromise the network
information
(v) RAMHU improves the mutual authentication be-
tween the server and clients to prevent spoofing and
impersonation attacks by either a fake server or client.
This prevents external attacks intended to deceive
trusted parties
(vi) We simulate RAMHU with an automated valida-
tion of Internet security protocols and applications
(AVISPA) tool that is generally acknowledged as an
effective way to represent the threat model. We have
usedAVISPA to prove that ourmodel is secure against
both passive and active attacks
1.2. Structure of the Paper. The remainder of this paper
proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses previous studies
related to our research. The threat model and basic concepts
about the techniques used in RAMHU are introduced in
Section 3. Section 4 describes the proposed authentication
model. Section 5 describes informal and formal security
analysis for our proposed scheme. The conclusion and future
research directions are presented in Section 6.
2. Related Work
There are many authentication schemes in the literature
related to our research area. This section discusses in brief
the suggestions in previous studies to design authentication
schemes in order to ensure the security of HC users in the
network. We investigated these solutions and found that they
had different drawbacks. We will discuss the solutions and
their disadvantages while clarifying the superiority of our
scheme over existing studies.
He and Zeadally [1] proposed an authentication scheme
based on ECC and advanced encryption standards (AES)
algorithms. Their scheme uses three entities: user, server,
and controller. The authors claimed that their scheme pro-
vides many requirements such as mutual authentication,
anonymity, and forward confidentiality. The problem with
this scheme is that user and controller identities are statically
sent to all three entities. If the attacker can penetrate the
encryption, he/she can see the related user and controller
identities. The attacker can then generate a random number,
temporary key, timestamp, and message authentication code.
Subsequently, he/she can encrypt the user and controller
identities and obtain the message authentication code and
send it to the network to become a legitimate and authen-
ticated user. In addition, this scheme uses a 160-bit key with
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ECC, which is considered unreliable by trusted institutions
such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). Our scheme uses a 256-bit key and does not exchange
real information for legitimate users between clients and
servers. An authentication protocol was proposed to pro-
tect patients’ passwords by RSA against off-line password-
guessing attacks [17]. The main problem in their scheme is
that the authors used RSA with the 1024 key. This algorithm
affects the performance of a hugeHCnetwork.Many schemes
recommend using ECC [26–28], as the ECC-160 is equivalent
to RSA-1024 with the same security level. In addition, their
protocol suffers from sending an ID clearly from a client to
the server at the registration phase, which causes authenti-
cation information to be detected for analysis attacks. Using
a shared key to implement an authentication mechanism is
designed to prevent known attacks, especially DoS attacks [6].
The authors used the wrong password detection mechanism
to reduce the risk of DoS attacks. However, the registration
phase of their scheme is not reliable if the ID of patients is
sent through an unsafe channel. Additionally, their research
suffers from scalability because of the use of the single secret-
key mechanism that needs protection from all parties.
Farash et al. [23] proposed an authentication scheme
based on ECC for HC environments. They pointed out
that their scheme provides forward secrecy. Their scheme
provides authentication during the exchange of messages
between the server and RFID’s (radio-frequency identifica-
tion’s) tag. However, their scheme shows that the information
(identities) and data are stored on a single server, and if the
server is hacked, the users’ information and data are exposed
to detection, tempering, and modification. The ECC and a
Petri Nets model are proposed to achieve an authentication
requirement to protect HC applications through the mobile
cloud [24]. The authors pointed out that their scheme is
resistant to attacks of eavesdropping, tracking, replay, and
spoofing. Unfortunately, their scheme does not address the
issue of steal/loss of tag or device and internal attacks that are
more serious than external attacks in accessing patients’ data
as well as no indication of what signature algorithm is used
for integrity. In addition, the tag’s ID is explicitly sent from
server to tag, which makes it easier for the attacker to parse
the authentication request. Jiang et al. [25] designed a three-
factor (biometric, smart card, and password) authentication
protocol to protect e-health clouds. Their scheme protects
authentication requests from impersonation attacks and off-
line password guessing if a mobile device is lost or stolen.
Their scheme relies on ECC to support the confidentiality
and authentication of HC’s users.They used a fuzzy extractor
to keep a biometric secret. However, this scheme relies on
a single server to authenticate users, which is the target of
the attackers. In addition, it performs 7 hash operations that
can exhaust the single server capabilities if the network has a
huge number of HC users, especially if it is not a lightweight
hash. Our model has superior capacity, as it uses a separation
server (attributes server) for users’ information and also only
5 lightweight hash operations in the central server.
Cloud-assisted conditional privacy preserving authen-
tication (CACPPA) [7] was proposed to authenticate the
network’s nodes. This scheme used ECIES and the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with a times-
tamp and pseudonym integration to perform the authen-
tication process. The problem with this scheme is that it
does not provide mutual authentication to prevent an attack
from a counterfeit party. Furthermore, the authors did not
explain the size of the keys in the algorithms to make sure
that their scheme was able to repel the various attacks.
Furthermore, a single pseudonym cannot separate the link
to the real information to prevent analysing and tracking
attacks for authentication requests. Das et al. [5] provided
a user authentication scheme for HC applications based on
AES and hash (SHA-1). They used biometrics users and the
anonymity feature to repel attacks such as replay, MITM,
and privileged insider. However, their scheme will suffer
from a key management problem if applied to a large health
institution with hundreds of users including managing users’
accounts from adding and deleting, as symmetric encryption
suffers from a scalability problem, as well as the difficulty of
managing the single secret key. Furthermore, the attacker can
submit a forgery attack on the login message if it detects the
single secret key. Recently, Chandrakar andOm [19] provided
an authentication scheme based on ECC and hash. Their
scheme has supported several servers in user authentication
with three factors. In this case, the user can connect to any
server to perform the authentication process. In this scheme,
the authors did not specify which hash algorithm was used
and the size of the message digest (MD), which is necessary
for repelling attacks such as collision and preimage. Using
multiple servers means that the same users’ information is
stored on more than one server and, thus, the penetration of
any server that causes users’ information to be detected or
modified. Additionally, this scheme did not use a mechanism
to prevent the association of real user information with
authentication requests such as pseudonyms.
3. The Basic Techniques for Our
Authentication Scheme
An authentication mechanism specifies connecting users to
network services securely.TheHC system needs a set of tech-
niques to implement the authentication mechanism before
accessing patients’ records. One authentication technique
will not be sufficient to repel known attacks. To ensure that
only legitimate users are associated with the HC application
network, our project includes a set of techniques to validate
the authentication request. In our scheme, we relied on
algorithms that provide lightweight operations and a high-
security level for encryption and signature operations. This
section describes the threat model and the basic concepts of
these techniques.
3.1. Threat Model. The threat model has been used to detect
security weakness in authentication schemes. The threat
model is applied to RAMHU based on the Dolev-Yao (dy)
[29] model in order to build a valid authentication process
in insecure environments such as a WLAN or the Internet.
The dy model is an efficient and practical way to illustrate
security protocols in the real world. In addition, it is a
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Figure 1: Arithmetic operations in ECC hierarchy.
Table 1: Keys sizes and some information for asymmetric algorithms.
Algo. Keys sizes Ratio Author(s) Year Mathematical problem
RSA 1024 2048 3072 7680 15360
1:6-30
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman 1978 Integer factorization
Elgamal Taher Elgamal 1985 Multiplicative group
ECIES 160-223 224-255 256-383 384-511 512-more Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller 1985 Elliptic curve discrete log. (ECDLP)
formal exemplar for modelling the risk of attackers against
authentication protocols. This model is useful in detecting
internal, external, single, and multiple attacks [30]. In our
threat model, we assume that an intruder is capable of
carrying out an internal, external, passive, or active attack
such asMITM, replay, eavesdropping, and spoofing. Also, we
assume that the attributes server (𝐴𝑆) is trustworthy. It is safe
against repository penetration attacks. We assume threats in
our model as follows:
(i) The attacker can steal the client application and its
files to analyse the data, retrieve the parameters, and
reveal the secret key and then use these applications
on different devices
(ii) The attacker can listen for authentication requests in
the insecure environment and execute interception,
replay, and MITM attacks in order to become a
legitimate user in the network
(iii) The attacker can execute a forgery or masquerading
attack in an attempt to penetrate the authentication
process
(iv) A legitimate user can perform a privileged insider
attack based on his/her legitimacy in the network
(v) The attacker can successfully guess the real username,
password, role, and pseudonym associated with it
during intensive analysis of many authentication
requests
3.2. Overview of Techniques
(i) Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES).
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has been used to provide
security requirements. It provides confidentiality, integrity,
and authentication in the communications network with
limited capacity in terms of power and processing. This
algorithm was independently proposed by Neal Koblitz and
VictorMiller in 1985 [31]. It depends on the discrete logarithm
problem (DLP), which is impervious to known attacks when
selecting parameters accurately [32], i.e., difficulty obtaining
k from P and Q (where k is an integer and P and Q are
two points on the curve). Small parameters used in ECC
help to perform computations quickly. These computations
are important in constrained-source and large environments
that require processing power, memory, or power con-
sumption [20, 33]. ECC provides encryption (Elliptic Curve
Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)), signature (Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)), and exchange
keys (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)) approaches
[31]. Many operations are performed in ECC algorithms
(described in four layers) as shown in Figure 1 [34]. ECIES
has provided confidentiality and proven to be extremely
efficient in its performance, as it uses small keys; thus, the
cost of computation is small compared with other public key
cryptography algorithms, such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA) [35]. Table 1 [33, 36, 37] shows a comparison of key
sizes for public key encryption algorithms
(ii) Lightweight Hash-Function Algorithm. The hash function
has been used to generate signatures for authentication
requests. PHOTON is a lightweight hash function and
extremely suitable for projects that require a robust and
reliable signature. This algorithm is based on a spongelike
construction and AES-like primitive for domain extension
and permutation efficiency [38–40]. PHOTON is available in
several versions (80, 128, 160, 224, and 256). It is a balance
between the efficiency in the execution of computations on
the one hand and security in the implementation of the
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Table 2: Comparison of lightweight hash function algorithms.
Algorithm Performance MD Security Author (s) Year
Gate equivalent area Throughput (kbps) PR SPR CR
SQUASH 2646 GE 0.15 64 64 64 0 Shamir 2005
MAME 8100 GE 146.7 256 - - - Yoshida et al. 2007
C-PRESENT-192 8048 GE 59.26 192 192 192 96 Bogdanov et al. 2008
ARMADILLO2 8653 GE 9.38 256 256 256 128 Bald et al. 2010
S-QUARK 2296 GE 3.13 256 224 112 112 Aumasson et al. 2010
KECCAK-f[400] 5090 GE 14.4 128 128 128 64 Kavun and Yalcin 2010
GLUON 4724 GE 32 224 224 112 112 Berger et al. 2011
SPONGENT-256 3281 GE 11.43 256 240 128 128 Bogdanov et al. 2011
PHOTON-256 2177 GE 0.88 256 224 128 128 Guo et al. 2011
features of the signature principle that depend on preimage
resistant (PR), second preimage resistant (SPR), collision
resistant (CR), and mixing-transformation [17] on the other
hand. It uses sponge construction and applies two phases
of absorbing and squeezing to produce a message digest
(MD); more details are available in [41]. Table 2 provides
a comparison among the lightweight hash algorithms (the
latest version of these algorithms) in terms of security and
efficiency [39, 41–46]. Although standard hash algorithms
are still used in applications such as SHA-1 (5527 GE, MD
160-bit) and SHA-2 (10868 GE, MD 256-bit), lightweight
hash algorithms such as PHOTON (2177 GE, MD 256-bit)
provides the most effective solution for handling complex
signatures in large HC systems.
Table 2 shows that the PHOTON-256 (2177 GE) provides
the best performance compared to all lightweight hash
functions and offers a high level of security through the
application of signature features PR (224), SPR (128), and CR
(128). Linear and differential attacks are the most powerful
attacks in the MD analysis of hash functions. Compared to
PHOTON, ARMADILLO and SPONGENT-256 also offer
signature features, but both are vulnerable to attacks, where
ARMIDLLO2 has been attacked by local linearization (prac-
tical semi-free-start collision attack) [47] and SPONGENT
has been attacked by linear distinguishers (23 rounds [48] and
13 rounds [49]) for all SPONGENTversions; and additionally,
they need the most computations (3281 GE and 8653 GE)
compared with PHOTON-256 (2177 GE). PHOTON is a
reliable algorithm against linear and differential attacks [41].
It has a high level of security and efficiency; therefore, it is
suitable for our project as a signature mechanism
(iii) One-Time Password (OTP). The OTP is a way to authen-
ticate legitimate users by generating a passcode or nonce
only once in a specified time. It will not be applicable
the next times for authentication. The OTP is an effective
method for authenticating users in HC applications if used
with robust encryption and signature technologies. Using
a static password or nonce without other authentication
mechanisms is weak in respect to attacks. Therefore, an OTP
provides significant support to the authentication process.
Thismechanismpreventsmany attacks such as replay,MITM,
and guessing [50]. The attacker cannot use this passcode or
nonce to connect to the network later. The client sends an
OTP as part of an authentication request. If the authentication
process is valid, the server will delete the OTP from the
dataset and will not accept it in the future. The OTP
is a powerful mechanism to mitigate the risk of hackers’
communication in the network. In this project, we apply an
OTP to generate a random password with the first link to
users in HC applications to ensure that only legitimate users
are connected to the network
(iv) Mutual Authentication. Mutual authentication is a pre-
requisite for preventing fraudulent authentication requests.
The traditional methods of authentication (such as password
and name) are not suitable for HC applications [18]. In
general, there are two kinds of authentication, simple and
mutual. In simple authentication, one party performs the
authentication process; for example, the server verifies the
authentication request for the client. This type of authenti-
cation is vulnerable to attacks such as spoofing and imper-
sonation. The attacker can use his device as a fake server to
receive all clients’ requests. Mutual authentication provides
a security solution to prevent known attacks [18]. In this
type of authentication, each party authenticates the other
party and, thus, prevents counterfeit attacks by both the client
and server. In RAMHU, we adopt the mechanism of mutual
authentication in the preservation of users’ information and
data
(v) Media Access Control (MAC) Address. AMAC address has
beenused to distinguish legitimate users’ devices in a network
during the completion of the authentication process. All
network devices of different types should contain a hardware
card (interface) to connect to the local or global network.
Each wire or wireless interface has a media access control
(MAC) or physical address that consists of 48 bits. It is divided
into six octets and written in hexadecimals such as “8C:
70: 5A: 41: 49: BC.” This address is a unique identifier (no
duplicate address twice) for a device defined as global and
persistent [51]. This address is used in WLAN because it
offers advantages such as reducing costs and speed in access
control procedures [52]. It can be changed programmatically
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Table 3: Paper’s notations.
Symbol Description
𝐶𝑖 Client entity or user
𝐶𝑆 Central server
𝐴𝑆 Attributes server
𝐷𝑆 Data server
𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖, 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 𝐶𝑖’s identity and medical centre identity
𝑃𝑊𝑖, 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖 𝐶𝑖’s password, temporary password
𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 𝐶𝑖 public and private key
𝐶𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖 , 𝐶𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 𝐶𝑆 public and private key
𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖 , 𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 𝐴𝑆 public and private key
𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 , 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆, 𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑆 Timestamp generated by 𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆, 𝐴𝑆
𝑁𝐶𝑖 , 𝑁𝐶𝑆, 𝑁𝐴𝑆 Nonce random generated by 𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆, 𝐴𝑆
𝐼 Internal or external intruder
𝐼𝐼, 𝐸𝐼 Internal intruder and external intruder
ℎ(.) One-way hash function
𝑅𝑖 Role of patient, patient relative, or provider
𝑅𝑅𝑖 Revocation reason
𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖 One-time password to authenticate first time
𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑗 Signature generated by 𝐶𝑖 and j is signature number
𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑗 Signature generated by 𝐶𝑆
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑗 Signature generated by 𝐴𝑆
𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 , 𝑃𝑀
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
User and medical centre pseudonyms sent by 𝐶𝑖 and verified by 𝐶𝑆
𝑈𝑃𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑆 , 𝑃𝑀
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 User and medical centre pseudonyms sent by 𝐶𝑆 and verified by 𝐴𝑆
𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑆 , 𝑃𝑀
𝐶𝑆
𝐴𝑆 User and medical centre pseudonyms sent by 𝐴𝑆 and verified by 𝐶𝑆
𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆, 𝑃𝑀
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆 User and medical centre pseudonyms sent by 𝐶𝑆 and verified by 𝐶𝑖
‖, ⊕ Concatenation and exclusive or operations
𝐺𝑀, 𝐶𝑀 Get MAC and checkMAC address
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖, 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖 Encryption and decryption operations
in various operating systems such as Linux and Windows.
In addition, anyone can use the Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP) to detect the MAC address of another user in the
network [53]. The main problem with this address is that
the attacker can execute an eavesdropping attack to access
the MAC addresses of legitimate devices in the network and
then select a legitimate MAC address to use it. For instance,
an attacker could execute an ARP poisoning or spoofing
attack by using a fake identifier of the MAC address (for a
legitimate entity) to gain illegal privileges that would enable
it to perform other attacks such as MITM and DoS [54].
In addition, randomization operations for the MAC address
have become useless in the protection against tracking attacks
[55, 56]. Therefore, if the server does not have a mechanism
to detect MAC address change, the attacker becomes a
legitimate user in the network and has access to network
resources
4. The Proposed Authentication Scheme
In this section, we will detail RAMHU that provides security
and efficiency features in HC applications. This section
will be divided into the network model, security goals,
and proposed authentication protocols. Notations listed in
Table 3 are used to describe symbols used throughout this
paper.
4.1. Network Model. The RAMHU model consists of four
entities, as shown in Figure 2:
(1) Client (𝐶𝑖): This entity includes patients, relatives
of patients, and HC providers such as doctors,
researchers, emergency practitioners, advisors, and
nurses
(2) Central server (𝐶𝑆): This entity is a gateway to
authenticate users with the attributes server and to
authorise the data server
(3) Attributes server (𝐴𝑆): This entity contains users’ real
information as well as multiple pseudonyms. The
authentication process requires verifying the asso-
ciation of the actual information with the multiple
pseudonyms in this entity
(4) Data server (𝐷𝑆): This entity contains users’ data
as well as multiple pseudonyms. This entity is not
implemented in our scheme and is left to future work.
Our scheme focuses only on the process of users’
authentication in the HC network
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Network model:
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Attributes server (AS)
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Acknowledgement 
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(with pseudonyms)
Figure 2: General network model.
Generally, 𝐶𝑖 creates an authentication request mainly
based on ECIES and PHOTON. 𝐶𝑖 sends a request to 𝐶𝑆 to
verify encryption, signature, and security parameters (such
as MAC address, pseudonyms, and 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖). Then, the 𝐶𝑆
sends a request to the 𝐴𝑆 to verify the link between the
pseudonyms, the real information, the signatures, and 𝑃𝑊𝑖.
After that, the 𝐴𝑆 sends the response to the 𝐶𝑆 that verifies
the signature and the parameters and then the 𝐶𝑆 sends
the response (authenticated or not) to the 𝐶𝑖. If the user
is authenticated, we assume that the user can then send an
authorisation request to access the data in the repository (𝐷𝑆)
and obtain the authorisation response from the 𝐶𝑆, 𝐴𝑆, and
𝐷𝑆.
4.2. Security Goals. To build a robust authentication scheme,
RAMHU adopts the following security requirements:
(i) Confidentiality: This requirement is performed to
hide authentication information and to preserve user
secrecy from detection by intruders. To implement
this requirement, a high-security cryptographic algo-
rithm [20] should be used. RAMHU executes ECIES
to hide authentication information about intruders
(ii) Integrity: This is to protect the authentication request
information from modification by intruders. The
authentication request should reach the intended
destination without modification to provide a reliable
communication channel for legitimate users [10, 57].
RAMHU performs a PHOTON to prevent any pro-
cess ofmodifying the user authentication information
in HC applications
(iii) Nonrepudiation: This requirement prevents both the
clients and server from denying their authentication
requests. This is a way to prove that the message is
sent by a particular sender in the HC applications
network. If a legitimate user in the network performs
internal attacks, he/she cannot deny his/her activities
while exploiting the privileges granted to him/her.
Our scheme uses PHOTON signatures and a MAC
address tomeet this requirement and detectmalicious
attacks
(iv) Anonymity: This requirement is extremely impor-
tant in supporting the confidentiality of the authen-
tication request. The purpose of this requirement
is to disguise the source and destination of the
authentication request. If the authentication scheme
applies anonymity with encryption, the attacker
finds it exceedingly difficult to analyse authentica-
tion requests for a particular user at different times
because the authentication request is different each
time the user is connected to the network [7].
RAMHU applies this requirement through the use of
random nonces between entities
(v) Pseudonym: This requirement denotes the provision
of a mechanism to connect nonreal attributes (such
as terms and symbols) with the real attributes of the
user (such as name, address, and phone number).
The use of this mechanism in HC applications is
an extremely important way to protect the personal
information of users and prevent the detection of
their identities. RAMHU uses a multiple-pseudonym
mechanism to prevent and separate the association
with real information
(vi) Forward secrecy: This requirement is accomplished
when network users use new keys and parameters
temporarily without relying on old ones.This require-
ment prevents attackers from exploiting users’ keys
and passwords in decrypting authentication requests.
Using the temporary random password, private key,
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and MAC, RAMHU prevents users from accessing
previous authentication information
(vii) Mutual authentication: This requirement is used in
HCapplications tomitigate the risks of external fraud.
With this feature, each party ensures that it deals with
a legitimate party. The server authenticates the client
by checking encryptions and signatures and vice
versa in order to establish a secure communication
channel. In RAMHU, 𝐶𝑆 and 𝐶𝑖 authenticate each
other to prevent masquerading and impersonating
attacks
(viii) Scalability:HCapplications operate in a scalable envi-
ronment in terms of data and users. Therefore, these
applications require authentication schemes capable
of handling and adapting to the ever-increasing num-
ber of users of HC applications. This requirement
refers to the ability of the authentication scheme to
appropriately handle large HC systems. Public key
encryption schemes are efficient in supporting this
requirement [24]
(ix) Freshness:This requirement indicates that the authen-
tication request is new and updated to ensure that
the attacker cannot replay the authentication request
at a later time. This requirement is achieved through
the provision of time checking, a random nonce, and
change of signatures in each authentication process to
counteract counterfeit attacks such as MITM, replay,
and impersonation [20], which ensures that the
authentication request is unaltered or not tampered
with
4.3. Proposed Authentication Scheme. The RAMHU scheme
consists of 5 protocols: initial setup, registration/login,
authentication, password update, and revocation. During
these protocols, RAMHU provides reliable authentication
processes to protect users’ information.
4.3.1. Initial Setup Protocol. In this protocol, all entities
are ready to start communicating with each other while
configuring all security parameters and ECIES’s keys as in the
following steps:
(i) Each legitimate user receives a client application from
the authorised system provider
(ii) Each legitimate user receives a 𝑃𝑊𝑖 (that can be
changed later) and a random 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖 to be used in the
first registration
(iii) All entities (𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆, and 𝐴𝑆) should create public
and private keys (𝐶𝑖 (𝐶𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖 , 𝐶𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖), 𝐶𝑆 (𝐶𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖 ,
𝐶𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖), and 𝐴𝑆 (𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖 , 𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖)) to be used to
validate the authentication request. All entities choose
an elliptic curve 𝐸𝑝(𝑎, 𝑏) over a prime field 𝐹𝑃 (where
𝑃 = 256) and base point 𝐺 on curve. Each entity
selects a private key 𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 randomly and generates the
public key 𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖 during the implementation of scalar
multiplication (𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖 = 𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝐺)
(iv) All entities broadcast the public key (𝐶𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖 , 𝐶𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖 ,
and 𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖) to use in ECIES’s encryption operations
4.3.2. Registration and Login Protocol. Patients and HC
providers (𝐶𝑖) should complete the registration and login
protocol with 𝐶𝑆 to become legitimate users of HC appli-
cations. Without this protocol, the user cannot complete
the authentication process in RAMHU. User registration is
performed once; namely, the user does not need to complete
the registration protocol the next times (only the login
protocol); the registration information has been kept in the
servers until the revocation protocol and deletion of the user
security parameters such as pseudonyms, MAC address, and
𝑃𝑊𝑖; this protocol accomplishes the following steps (Figure 3
shows the registration and login protocol and Figure 4 shows
the login protocol):
𝐶𝑖 Side
(i) The user enters 𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖 (such as his/her name), 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖
(such as medical centre name), and 𝑃𝑊𝑖 and 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖
for registration and login while only entering 𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖,
𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖, and𝑃𝑊𝑖 for the login protocol the next times to
the client (𝐶𝑖) application.𝐶𝑖 replaces𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖with user’s
pseudonym (𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ) and 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 with medical centre
pseudonym (𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ) to protect the authentication
informationwhenmoving from𝐶𝑖 to𝐶𝑆.𝐶𝑖 generates
a timestamp (𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖) to be used to verify the sending
time of the registration/login request in 𝐶𝑆
(ii) 𝐶𝑖 gets a MAC address (GM) by entering its IP
(Internet protocol) address. The process of checking
MAC (𝐶𝑀) is performed by 𝐶𝑖 to test the cred-
ibility of the MAC address. In the Linux system,
we used the command “ethtool -P interface name”
(such as “ethtool -P wlo1”) in the 𝐶𝑖 application.
If the result is identical to 𝐺𝑀, it means that the
MAC address is native (𝐶𝑀 = “𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝐴𝐶”). In
the Windows system, 𝐶𝑖 searches for string value
“NetworkAddress” in the path of the system reg-
istry (“𝐻𝐾𝐸𝑌 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐸 \ 𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑀 \
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 \ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 \ 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 \ {4𝐷36𝐸972 −
𝐸325 − 11𝐶𝐸 − 𝐵𝐹𝐶1 − 08002𝐵𝐸10318}\”). If Net-
workAddress = null, 𝐶𝑀 = “𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝐴𝐶”; otherwise
𝐶𝑀 = “𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑀𝐴𝐶”. The 𝐺𝑀 send is encrypted with
a registration/login request while 𝐶𝑀 is implicitly
sent with the signature value (𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1). In only the
login protocol, 𝐶𝑖 needs to extract a private key
from the temporary key,MAC address, password, and
random nonce through 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 ⊕ 𝐺𝑀 ⊕ 𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕
𝑁𝐶𝑖 . 𝐶𝑖 generates a random nonce (𝑁𝐶𝑖) to change
signature and encryption data and add anonymity to
the registration/login request
(iii) 𝐶𝑖 performs two signatures using the PHOTON-256
algorithm to protect information from modification.
The first signature includes the parameters check
MAC, nonce, and timestamp (𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 = ℎ(𝐶𝑀 ‖
𝑁𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖)). The second signature includes all
the authentication parameters of the gotten MAC,
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Figure 3: Registration and login protocol.
nonce, timestamp, first signature, pseudonyms, one-
time password, and password (𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔2 = ℎ(𝐺𝑀 ‖
𝑁𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖ 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑂𝑇𝑃 ‖
𝑃𝑊𝑖)). In the login protocol, 𝑂𝑇𝑃 is not added to the
signature
(iv) 𝐶𝑖 computes a temporary value (𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖 = 𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕
𝑁𝐶𝑖 ⊕ 𝐺𝑀⊕ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1) of 𝑃𝑊𝑖 when moving from 𝐶𝑖 to
𝐶𝑆
(v) 𝐶𝑖 uses ECIES to encrypt and hide all the data of
this request (𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑁𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝐺𝑀 ‖ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 ‖
𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖ 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖 ‖ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔2)). In
the login protocol, 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖 and 𝐺𝑀 are not added to
the encryption as in Figure 4. After that, 𝐶𝑖 sends
the registration and login request or login to 𝐶𝑆 to
complete the authentication protocol. Then 𝐶𝑖 hides
the private key by 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 ⊕𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔2
𝐶𝑆 Side
(i) Upon receiving a registration and login request or
login request, 𝐶𝑆 decrypts this request using ECIES’s
𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖 and 𝐶𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 . It checks the timestamp (𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆-
𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ≤ 󳵻𝑇) to make sure that this request arrived at
an appropriate time and without delay
(ii) In the registration and login protocol, 𝐶𝑆 examines
the random 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖 in the dataset. If 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖 exists, then
the user is legitimate for the registration process. After
that, 𝐶𝑆 deletes 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖 from the dataset to prevent it
from being used the next times. If 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖 is not found,
it discards the connection. In the login protocol,
𝐶𝑆 examines 𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 and 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
and then tests their
association with the MAC address in the dataset. If
𝐺𝑀 is found, 𝐶𝑆 completes the steps of this protocol;
otherwise, it cancels the connection
(iii) 𝐶𝑆 needs to ensure that the user’s device is legitimate
within the network. 𝐶𝑆 computes the signature value
to make sure that the MAC address is native and
nonmodified (𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔1 = ℎ(“Real MAC”‖ 𝑁𝐶𝑖 ‖
𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖)). It examines the result of the computed sig-
nature (𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔1) with 𝐶𝑖’s signature (𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1). If the
signatures results are identical, then the device is
legitimate and the MAC address did not change. In
the registration and login protocol, 𝐶𝑆 stores this
address in the dataset for use and checks the next
times in the login protocol
(iv) 𝐶𝑆 performs the computation operation 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕
𝑁𝐶𝑖 ⊕𝐺𝑀⊕𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔1 to extract the 𝑃𝑊𝑖 value and then
uses this value to produce a second signature (𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔2)
(v) 𝐶𝑆 computes a second signature operation (𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔2=
ℎ(𝐺𝑀 ‖ 𝑁𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔1 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖ 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖
𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖 ‖ 𝑃𝑊𝑖)) to guarantee that all the encrypted
information is not changed. Then, it compares the
computed signature (𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔2) with the received sig-
nature in the request (𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔2). If the signatures are
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Figure 4: Login protocol.
identical, then the information for this request is
unchanged or not tampered with. In the login proto-
col, 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖 and 𝐺𝑀 are not added to the signature. At
this point, 𝐶𝑆 prepares to send the user’s authentica-
tion request to 𝐴𝑆
4.3.3. Authentication Protocol. The authentication protocol
verifies the reliability of the users’ security parameters with
their personal information in the server. In this protocol,
RAMHU needs to link pseudonyms and passwords with real
information for users in 𝐴𝑆’s datasets. Note that the users’
information (such as name, age, address, mobile number, and
passwords) is stored in a separate server (AS) and multiple
pseudonyms are used to prevent detection and tracking
of users’ information. This protocol is illustrated in the
following steps (Figure 5 shows the authentication protocol
in RAMHU):
𝐶𝑆 Side
(i) 𝐶𝑆 computes a new timestamp (𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆) to ensure the
fresh authentication request
(ii) 𝐶𝑆 replaces 𝐶𝑖’s pseudonyms (𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
and𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ) with
𝐶𝑆’s pseudonyms (𝑈𝑃𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑆 and𝑀𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 ) to prevent attack-
ers from tracking the authentication request. It gen-
erates random nonce (𝑁𝐶𝑆) to ensure an anonymous
authentication request
(iii) 𝐶𝑆 signs security parameters by PHOTON-256
(𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔3 = ℎ(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑁𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 )) to prevent
modification of authentication request information
(iv) 𝐶𝑆 computes temporary 𝑃𝑊𝑖 by the computation of
𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕ 𝑁𝐶𝑆 ⊕ 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔3
(v) 𝐶𝑆 encrypts information of authentication request
(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑁𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔3 ‖
𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖)). It sends an authentication request to verify
user’s information in 𝐴𝑆
𝐴𝑆 Side
(i) Upon receiving the authentication request, 𝐴𝑆 de-
crypts that request using ECIES’s 𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 and 𝐶𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖
to obtain the authentication information clearly
(ii) It checks the timestamp by 𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑆 − 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 ≤ 󳵻𝑇 to
ensure that the authentication request is not delayed.
𝐴𝑆 checks the pseudonyms (𝑈𝑃𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑆 and 𝑀𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 ) sent
fromCS and correlates them with the user’s real iden-
tifier (𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖 and𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖) in the datasets. 𝐴𝑆 extracts the
user’s password from the equation 𝑃𝑊𝑖 = 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊i ⊕
𝑁𝐶𝑆⊕𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔3. After that, it checksmatching𝑃𝑊𝑖 in the
dataset. 𝐴𝑆 computes the value of the signature based
on authentication information (𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔1 = ℎ(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 ‖
𝑁𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 )) by PHOTON-256. 𝐴𝑆 com-
pares the computed value of the signature (𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔1)
with the value of the received signature (𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔3). If
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Figure 5: Authentication protocol.
the signature values are identical, the user’s informa-
tion in the request for the signature is unmodified. At
this point, 𝐴𝑆 considers this user to be legitimate and
reliable
(iii) 𝐴𝑆 prepares a response to authenticate the request of
that user. It computes a new timestamp (𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑆 = new
𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑆) to prevent delayed or replayed requests at later
times.𝐴𝑆 replaces𝐶𝑆’s pseudonyms (𝑈𝑃𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑆 and𝑈𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 )
received with 𝐴𝑆’s pseudonyms (𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑆 and𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐴𝑆 ) to
hide users’ information. It generates a new random
nonce (𝑁𝐴𝑆) to add anonymity and prevent attacks
from encryption and signature analysis
(iv) 𝐴𝑆 computes a signature (𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔2 = ℎ(𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑆 ‖ 𝑁𝐴𝑆 ‖
𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑆 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐴𝑆 )) to prevent modifications of authenti-
cation response information
(v) 𝐴𝑆 encrypts the authentication information
(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖(𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑆 ‖ 𝑁𝐴𝑆 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐴𝑆 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐴𝑆 ‖ 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔2))
and sends the authentication response to 𝐶𝑆 to
complete the authentication process
𝐶𝑆 Side
(i) 𝐶𝑆 decrypts the authentication response (𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖)
received from 𝐴𝑆. It checks the timestamp value
(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 − 𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑆 ≤ 󳵻𝑇) to prevent late authentication
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responses. It examines 𝑈𝑃𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑆 and𝑀𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 in datasets to
complete the process of linking multiple pseudonyms
to the user
(ii) 𝐶𝑆 computes the signature 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔4 = ℎ(𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑆 ‖ 𝑁𝐴𝑆 ‖
𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑆 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐴𝑆 ) for authentication response infor-
mation. It compares the computed result of the
signature (𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔4) with the value of the received
signature (𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔2). If the signature values match,
then the authentication response information is un-
changed
(iii) After this point, 𝐶𝑆 initiates a login response request.
It computes the value of new timestamp (𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 =
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆). It replaces 𝐴𝑆’s pseudonyms (𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐴𝑆 and
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑆 ) received with 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆 and 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆. It generates
a new random nonce (𝑁𝐶𝑆) to hide encryption and
signature information
(iv) 𝐶𝑆 computes a new signature value (𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔5 =
ℎ(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑁𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆
‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆
)) to protect login
response information frommodification
(v) 𝐶𝑆 encrypts login response information (𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 ‖
𝑁𝐶S ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆
‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆
‖ 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔5)) and sends this
response to 𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑖 Side
(i) 𝐶𝑖 extracts his private key (𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖) from 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 ⊕
𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔2 and decrypts the login request (𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖)
received from 𝐶𝑆
(ii) 𝐶𝑖 checks the timestamp (𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 −𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 ≤ 󳵻𝑇) to ensure
that the login response is not late or replayed
(iii) 𝐶𝑖 checks that 𝐶𝑆’s pseudonyms (𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆 and 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆)
are received in the dataset and associated with 𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖
and 𝑀𝑃C𝑆𝐶𝑖 . At this point, RAMHU applied multiple
pseudonyms among model entities (𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆, and 𝐴𝑆)
to prevent traceability in linking the real information
of the user with pseudonyms
(iv) 𝐶𝑖 calculates the value of the signature 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔3 =
ℎ(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑁C𝑆 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆) for login re-
sponse information. It compares the result of the
computed signature (𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔3) and the value of the
received signature (𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔5 ). If the signature values are
identical, namely, the login response information is
unmodified or not tamperedwith,𝐶𝑖 accepts the login
response; otherwise 𝐶𝑖 discards the login response.
Then,𝐶𝑖 hides its private key by 𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 ⊕𝐺𝑀⊕𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕
𝑁𝐶𝑖 after generating a random nonce to prevent the
detection of the private key if the device is hacked.
At this point, if all processes are achieved correctly,
then all requests are considered legitimate and reli-
able through the implementation of mutual authenti-
cation
4.3.4. Password Update Protocol. Updating the password is
a security procedure to ensure authentication of legitimate
users. The process of changing 𝑃𝑊𝑖 is important in any HC
system for two reasons. First, it prevents the use of 𝑃𝑊𝑖
fixed for a long time which reduces the guessing attacks.
Second, changing𝑃𝑊𝑖 gives usersmore flexibility in choosing
the appropriate 𝑃𝑊𝑖. This process requires strict security
measures to protect the new 𝑃𝑊𝑖. RAMHU provides the
legitimate user with amechanism to change his/her password
at any time. If the user wants to change his/her 𝑃𝑊𝑖,
the following illustration describes the new 𝑃𝑊𝑖 protection
procedures in a secure manner (Figure 6 shows the password
update protocol in RAMHU):
(i) 𝐶𝑖 side: 𝐶𝑖 enters 𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖, 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖, the old 𝑃𝑊𝑖, and
the new 𝑃𝑊𝑖. It replaces 𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖 and 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 with
pseudonyms to hide the user’s real information. 𝐶𝑖
calls the MAC address and then extracts the private
key from 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖⊕𝐺𝑀⊕𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖⊕𝑁𝐶𝑖 to use in the
encryption process of the password update request.𝐶𝑖
generates three random nonces (𝑁𝐶1 , 𝑁𝐶2 , and 𝑁𝐶3)
and computes a new timestamp (𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖). 𝐶𝑖 computes
the signature value (𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 = ℎ(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑁𝐶1 ‖
𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖ 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖)) by PHOTON-256 based
on the parameters of the password change request.
It applies an anonymity mechanism to the old 𝑃𝑊𝑖
and new 𝑃𝑊𝑖 (𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖 = 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕𝑁𝐶2 ⊕ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1
and 𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑊𝑖 = 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕ 𝑁𝐶3 ⊕ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1) to hide
passwords and not explicitly send them in the 𝑃𝑊𝑖
change request. It encrypts the 𝑃𝑊𝑖 change request
(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑁𝐶1 ‖ 𝑁𝐶2 ‖ 𝑁𝐶3 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖ 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖
𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑊𝑖 ‖ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1)) and sends it
to 𝐶𝑆; 𝐶𝑖 then hides its private key by 𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 ⊕ 𝐺𝑀⊕
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕ 𝑁𝐶𝑖
(ii) 𝐶𝑆 side: 𝐶𝑆 receives and decrypts a password update
request (𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖). It examines the timestamp to prevent
delayed requests and examines 𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 and 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
in
datasets. 𝐶𝑆 extracts the old 𝑃𝑊𝑖 and new 𝑃𝑊𝑖 from
𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕ 𝑁𝐶2 ⊕ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 and 𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕
𝑁𝐶3 ⊕ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1. Then, it computes the signature value
(𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔1) depending on 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 , 𝑁𝐶1 , 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
, 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 , and
𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖 to check the matching between 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔1 and
𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1. Similarly, in the authentication protocol, 𝐶𝑆
computes 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 and replaces pseudonyms. 𝐶𝑆 gener-
ates three nonces 𝑁𝐶𝑆1 , 𝑁𝐶𝑆2 , and 𝑁𝐶𝑆3 and then 𝐶𝑆
computes the signature value (ℎ(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑁𝐶1 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖)) and hides the old𝑃𝑊𝑖 and new𝑃𝑊𝑖
by 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕ 𝑁𝐶𝑆2 ⊕ 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔2 and 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕ 𝑁𝐶𝑆3 ⊕
𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔2. It encrypts the password update request with
security parameters (𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆, 𝑁𝐶𝑆1 , 𝑁𝐶𝑆2 , 𝑁𝐶𝑆3 , 𝑈𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 ,
𝑀𝑃𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑆 , 𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖, 𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑊𝑖, and 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔2) and
sends to 𝐴𝑆
(iii) 𝐴𝑆 side: 𝐴𝑆 receives the password update request
and decrypts (𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖) this request with 𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 and
𝐶𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑖 . It checks time delay and then it checks
link pseudonyms with real information for users. It
extracts the old𝑃𝑊𝑖 from 𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖⊕𝑁𝐶𝑆2⊕𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔2
and then it checks the old 𝑃𝑊𝑖 in the dataset. It com-
putes the signature value 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔1 = ℎ(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑁𝐶𝑆1 ‖
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Figure 6: Password update protocol.
𝑈𝑃𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖), and then it compares
the calculated result (𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔1) with the result of the
received signature (𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔2). If they are identical, the
signature is true; otherwise,𝐴𝑆 rejects the𝑃𝑊𝑖 change
request. 𝐴𝑆 performs the calculation 𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕
𝑁𝐶𝑆3 ⊕ 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔2 to obtain the new 𝑃𝑊𝑖 value. If all
previous checks are validated,𝐴𝑆 changes the old𝑃𝑊𝑖
to the new 𝑃𝑊𝑖
4.3.5. Revocation Protocol. Revocation in HC applications is
used when a user finishes a task or to prevent attack. This
protocol can be completed by 𝐶𝑖 or 𝐴𝑆. For example, 𝐶𝑖
wants to cancel his/her account from the HC system after
completing his/her duties such as a research doctor who uses
the system for a limited period and then cancels his account
after the completion of his duties. Additionally,𝐴𝑆 can revoke
the account of any user who performs suspicious activities
(internal attacks) that are not within his/her privileges such
as a nurse who wants to access the personal information
of a particular doctor or patient. Furthermore, the user can
request from the authorities provider (𝐴𝑆) to revoke his/her
account information that is associated with his/her data (note
that the patients’ data history remains stored in the 𝐷𝑆
even after the completion of the revocation protocol). The
protocol of revocation is extremely important in restricting
the malicious activities of HC systems. RAMHU includes a
revocation protocol to provide strict security procedures in
protecting users’ authentication information (Figure 7 shows
the revocation protocol in the 𝐶𝑖 side in RAMHU):
Revocation from 𝐶𝑖 Side
(i) 𝐶𝑖 enters 𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖, 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖, and 𝑃𝑊𝑖 and then replaces
𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖 with 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
and 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 with 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
. It chooses
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Figure 7: Revocation protocol.
the revocation reason (𝑅𝑅𝑖) from the drop-down list
(such as ending the researcher’s study, ending a satis-
factory condition, resigning a professional, changing
a health institution, and the unwillingness of a patient
to use the system). These reasons have converted to
signatures using PHOTON to get MDs with 256 bits
in the dataset. 𝐶𝑖 computes the new 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 , 𝑁𝐶1 , 𝑁𝐶2 ,
and𝑁𝐶3 .Then,𝐶𝑖 performs the process of𝑅𝑅𝑖⊕𝑁𝐶1 to
add randomness for 𝑅𝑅𝑖. Using this procedure is very
useful in tightening security and distinguishing the
roles of users (patients or professionals) in𝐶𝑆. It com-
putes the signature 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 = ℎ(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑁𝐶1 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑅𝑅𝑖 ‖ 𝑃𝑊𝑖 ‖ “delete”). 𝐶𝑖 performs a com-
putation to hide 𝑅𝑅𝑖 (𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖 ⊕𝑁𝐶2 ⊕𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1).
𝐶𝑖 computes the temporary 𝑃𝑊𝑖 value of 𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕
𝑁𝐶3 ⊕ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 to hide the 𝑃𝑊𝑖 value. Additionally, it
computes encryption (𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑁𝐶1 ‖ 𝑁𝐶2 ‖ 𝑁𝐶3 ‖
𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖ 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖 ‖ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1))
and sends a revocation request to 𝐶𝑆. Then, it hides
a private key, in the same way, in the password update
protocol
(ii) 𝐶𝑆 decrypts (𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖) and computes the timestamp and
examines 𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 and𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
in the datasets. It obtains
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𝑅𝑅𝑖 from the computation equation 𝑅𝑅𝑖 = 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑖 ⊕
𝑁𝐶2 ⊕ 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔1. It extracts 𝑃𝑊𝑖 from 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕ 𝑁𝐶3 ⊕
𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 and checks 𝑃𝑊𝑖 matching in the dataset. 𝐶𝑆
computes the signature (𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔1 = ℎ(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑁𝐶1 ‖
𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖ 𝑅𝑅𝑖 ‖ 𝑃𝑊𝑖 ‖ “delete”)) and then
compares the results of the signatures. 𝐶𝑆 computes
operation 𝑅𝑅𝑖 ⊕ 𝑁𝐶1 to use 𝑅𝑅𝑖’s signature in order
to compare 𝑅𝑅𝑖 with the user’s 𝑅𝑖. If all operations are
achieved and validated correctly,𝐶𝑆 sends a request to
𝐴𝑆 to check the pseudonym’s association with the real
information and check 𝑃𝑊𝑖. 𝐴𝑆 deletes association
between pseudonyms and information and delete the
user’s𝑃𝑊𝑖 from the dataset. 𝐴𝑆 sends aMAC deletion
request to 𝐶𝑆. Upon receiving the MAC deletion
request, 𝐶𝑆 decrypts this request and then checks
security parameters and signature. If all operations
are achieved and validated correctly, 𝐶𝑆 deletes the
MAC address from the dataset. At this point, this
user cannot perform an authentication process in
RAMHU
Revocation from 𝐴𝑆 Side
(i) 𝐴𝑆 deletes the association between user’s information
and pseudonyms and 𝑃𝑊𝑖 in datasets. It sends an
encrypted request (𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖) to 𝐶𝑆 to delete the device’s
MAC address for this user. After the completion of
this protocol, the user is considered illegal and cannot
access HC services
5. Security Analysis
In this section, a theoretical and an experimental security
analysis have been presented. We describe how RAMHU
applies security requirements in protecting users’ authenti-
cation information in the HC system.
5.1. Theoretical Security Analysis. The theoretical security
analysis shows that RAMHU is secure against the various
known attacks. In this section, we will show how RAMHU
provides a high-security level against these attacks by provid-
ing assumptions and proofs. Table 4 summarises the compar-
ison between RAMHU and other authentication protocols in
resistance against various attacks.
(i) RAMHU prevents a privileged insider attack.
Proof 1:The internal intruder (𝐼𝐼) needs to eavesdrop
on authentication requests between 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶𝑆. After
that, he/she tries to perform an analysis of these
requests based on his/her access privileges to the
network. First, the analysis of these requests to obtain
the private key or password is infeasible because the
authentication request is encrypted by the ECIES-
256-bit algorithm; 𝐼𝐼 cannot decrypt these requests
with his/her private key. Second, if 𝐼𝐼 broke the
encryption (which is impossible), he/she is unable to
extract the 𝑃𝑊𝑖 value (𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖 = 𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕𝑁𝐶𝑖 ⊕ 𝐺𝑀⊕
𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1) in the login protocol because it is hidden and
depends on the values of 𝐺𝑀, 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1, and𝑁𝐶𝑖 where
𝐼𝐼 does not know the 𝐺𝑀 value of the legitimate
user’s device, and the𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 value depends on the𝐶𝑀
value that is also not known to 𝐼𝐼.Therefore, RAMHU
prevents a privileged insider attack
(ii) RAMHU is resistant to a stealing attack.
Proof 2: In the first case, the intruder (𝐼) steals
a legitimate user’s device (such as a laptop) that
contains a client application. In our scheme, the user’s
𝑃𝑊𝑖 and 𝐼𝐷𝑠 are not stored on the user’s device or in
the client application. In addition, the private key is
hidden and random for each authentication process
by 𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 ⊕ 𝐺𝑀 ⊕ 𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕ 𝑁𝐶𝑖 . Additionally, Proof 1
shows that the 𝑃𝑊𝑖 value cannot be extracted from
𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖. If 𝐼 is 𝐼𝐼, he/she also cannot use his/her
𝐼𝐷𝑠 and 𝑃𝑊𝑖 to access information or other user data
because both 𝐶𝑆 and 𝐴𝑆 perform matching 𝐼𝐷𝑠 and
𝑃𝑊𝑖 to determine user-related information and data.
In the second case, the attacker steals only the client
application. 𝐼 cannot use the application on another
device because it does not have 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖 or the original
MAC,which prevents the application frombeing used
on another device even if 𝐼 knows the 𝐼𝐷𝑠 and 𝑃𝑊𝑖.
The original MAC mechanism (𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 = ℎ(𝐶𝑀 ‖
𝑁𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖)) prevents the fake authentication request
from being verified in the server because 𝐼 cannot
generate an original MAC address (𝐶𝑀) in 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1.
Thus, RAMHU is resistant to a stealing attack
(iii) RAMHU resists replay attack.
Proof 3: 𝐼 tries to get a login/registration/authenti-
cation request for a legitimate user to send it later and
thus gains access to the network.This case is infeasible
in our scheme because all entities (𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆, and 𝐴𝑆)
use a timestamp (such as 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 − 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ≤ 󳵻𝑇, where
󳵻𝑇 is the maximum transfer delay rate) that prevents
the attacker from sending the authentication request
at a later time. Furthermore, signatures and random
nonces are not usable the next times. Hence, RAMHU
successfully resists replay attack
(iv) RAMHU overcomes the MITM attack.
Proof 4: Assume that an 𝐼 attempts to intercept
encrypted login/authentication requests (such as
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑁𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶i
‖ 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖
𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖 ‖ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔2)) among network entities and
then modifies or replaces these requests with his/her
messages to send to network entities. However, the
attacker cannot replace exchanged requests among
𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆, and 𝐴𝑆 because, first, he/she does not
know the private keys (𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 , 𝐶𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 , 𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖) and,
therefore, the decryption process is computation-
ally infeasible with 256-bit key length and difficulty
in solving ECDLP. Second, mutual authentication
with PHOTON-256 signatures prevents the modi-
fication of requests between RAMHU’s entities. As
a result, RAMHU gracefully overcomes the MITM
attack
16 Security and Communication Networks
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(v) RAMHU is safe against guessing attack.
Proof 5: Assume that an external intruder (𝐸𝐼) was
able to penetrate the encryption (𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖) between 𝐶𝑖
and 𝐶𝑆 (from Proof 4, this assumption is infeasible).
This 𝐸𝐼 tries to guess 𝑃𝑊𝑖 in a login request to use it
to access the network as a legitimate user. 𝐸𝐼 cannot
detect 𝑃𝑊𝑖 for any authorised user (either on-line or
off-line) because he/she does not know the configured
process to protect 𝑃𝑊𝑖 (𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖 = 𝑃𝑊𝑖 ⊕ 𝑁𝐶𝑖 ⊕
𝐺𝑀 ⊕ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1) and does not know the MAC address
for that user and, thus, the process of deriving 𝑃𝑊𝑖
is infeasible (Proof 1). It is an extremely difficult
process to guess𝑃𝑊𝑖 from 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖, which is 64 hexes
(256 bits). In addition, 𝐸𝐼 cannot detect 𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖 and
𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 for any legitimate user because of the use of
the multiple-pseudonym mechanism for users and
medical centres instead of sending real information to
legitimate users. As a result, RAMHU is safe against
guessing attack
(vi) RAMHU withstands client impersonation attack.
Proof 6: Assume that an attacker tries to impersonate
a login request (such as 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖 = 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑁𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 ‖
𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖ 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊𝑖 ‖ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔2) for a legitimate
user.This 𝐼 can create𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 and𝑁𝐶𝑖 but does not know
𝑃𝑊𝑖 and 𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑖 (Proofs 1 and 4) for the legitimate
user; namely, 𝐼 cannot impersonate the user identity.
𝐼 also tries to impersonate the legitimate user’s device
by programmatically changing the MAC address to a
legitimate one to gain access to the network.This case
is infeasible because the original MAC check (𝐶𝑀) in
𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 = ℎ(𝐶𝑀 ‖ 𝑁𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖) detects the attacker’s
attempt to mimic the legitimate user’s device (as in
Proof 2).Therefore, RAMHU withstands instances of
impersonating the user’s identity and device
(vii) RAMHU resists server impersonation attack.
Proof 7: Assume that an 𝐼 traps login requests from
𝐶𝑖 to 𝐶𝑆. The attacker tries to deceive 𝐶𝑖 by sending
fake requests to 𝐶𝑖 in order to inform them that he
is a legitimate server. 𝐼 needs the private key for
CS to decrypt and to accomplish the attack. Mutual
authentication prevents 𝐼 from impersonating 𝐶𝑆’s
requests (such as 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑁𝐶𝑆 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆
‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆
‖
𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔5)) and sending them to 𝐶𝑖. This mechanism
ensures that 𝐶𝑖 deals with legitimate 𝐶𝑆. Conse-
quently, our protocol effectively resists server imper-
sonation attack
(viii) RAMHU resists DoS attack.
Proof 8: In order for 𝐼 to execute a DoS attack against
𝐶𝑆 and 𝐴𝑆, he/she needs to decrypt the login request
and change its data or send the same request multiple
times for destroying servers.However, in the first case,
decryption and change of signatures are infeasible
as in Proofs 2 and 4. 𝐶𝑆 checks signature validity
and rejects login requests containing fake signatures,
and 𝐼 cannot execute a collision or preimage attack
because PHOTON-256 supplies PR, SPR, and CR. In
the second case, the attacker sends the same request
multiple times. This status is infeasible because CS
or AS checks the timestamp (𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 , 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑆, 𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑆) for
each login/authentication request and eliminates all
late requests (Proof 3) without checking the other
security parameters such as 𝑃𝑊𝑖, 𝐶𝑀, and multiple
pseudonyms. In case 𝐼 can break the encryption,
he/she can change the timestamp and nonce but
cannot tamper with the signatures. RAMHUprevents
this condition during 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 and does not need to
check the remaining security parameters. Therefore,
RAMHU successfully resists DoS attack
(ix) RAMHU is secure against password change attack.
Proof 9: Assume that an 𝐼 intercepts a request
to change 𝑃𝑊𝑖 between 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶𝑆. 𝐼 obtains
an encrypted password update request (such as
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑁𝐶1 ‖ 𝑁𝐶2 ‖ 𝑁𝐶3 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖ 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖
𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑊𝑖 ‖ 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1)). If 𝐼 can
decrypt it (this process is infeasible as in Proofs 1
and 4), he/she will find a temporary password and
cannot derive a new𝑃𝑊𝑖 because it depends on𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1
= ℎ(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑁𝐶1 ‖ 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖ 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖).
The signature operation (𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1) is based on the
old 𝑃𝑊𝑖 which is not explicitly sent to 𝐶𝑆 in this
protocol. 𝐼 does not know the old 𝑃𝑊𝑖 and, therefore,
he/she cannot create a signature to complete the
𝑃𝑊𝑖 change process. Thereupon, RAMHU provides
a reliable solution against password change attack
(x) RAMHU is resistant to eavesdropping attack.
Proof 10: Assume that an 𝐼 eavesdrops on login/au-
thentication requests to gain information about user
authentication and access to the network. However,
in our scheme, 𝐼 will not benefit from requests that
are intercepted because RAMHU uses the ECIES
algorithm with a 256-bit key to encrypt authenti-
cation information. The attacker can only decrypt
requests by deriving private keys and this operation
is infeasible (as in Proofs 1 and 2) due to key length
and random encryption with nonces (anonymity).
Therefore, our protocol is resistant to eavesdropping
attack
(xi) RAMHU resists traceability attack.
Proof 11: 𝐼 attempts to collect as many login/authen-
tication requests as possible and then performs an
analysis of those requests that helps him/her to
perform user identity tracing. When an 𝐼 succeeds
in tracking user requests, he/she can detect and dis-
tinguish patients’ data. All exchanged requests among
RAMHU’s entities do not contain direct users’ infor-
mation (such as username). RAMHUreplaces the real
user 𝐼𝐷𝑠 (𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖 and 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖) with pseudonyms. Our
protocol uses multiple pseudonyms (𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 , 𝑈𝑃
𝐴𝑆
𝐶𝑆 ,
𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑆 , and 𝑈𝑃
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆 for users and 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
, 𝑀𝑃𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑆 , 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐴𝑆 ,
and 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑆
for medical centres) to prevent attackers
from tracking user requests and revealing their iden-
tities when they are transferred between RAMHU
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entities (𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆, and 𝐴𝑆). Hence, RAMHU resists
traceability attack
(xii) RAMHU prevents revocation attack.
Proof 12: Assume that an 𝐼 tries to penetrate a
revocation request. The attacker tries to analyse the
request and use it to prevent users from accessing
the network’s services. Depending on Proofs 1, 5, and
11, the attacker cannot extract or distinguish 𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖,
𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖, and 𝑃𝑊𝑖 from the revocation request. The
attacker does not know and cannot extract a reason
from 𝑡𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑖, which is based on the values of 𝑅𝑅𝑖,
𝑁𝐶2 , and 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1. In Proofs 2 and 8, 𝐼 cannot perform
collision, preimage, and second preimage attacks
against the PHOTON-256 algorithm. Thus, our pro-
tocol prevents penetration of revocation request
(xiii) RAMHU resists verifier attack.
Proof 13: Assume that 𝐼 tries to penetrate the datasets
in 𝐶𝑆. If the attacker is 𝐸𝐼, he/she cannot penetrate
datasets because he/she does not have 𝐾𝑝𝑟, 𝑈𝐼𝐷,
𝑀𝐼𝐷, 𝑂𝑇𝑃, and 𝑃𝑊𝑖. If the attacker is 𝐼𝐼, when he
penetrates datasets in 𝐶𝑆 and wants to impersonate
another user’s identity, first, he/she cannot distinguish
this information for a particular user because the real
information for users is stored in𝐴𝑆. Second, since𝐶𝑆
does not contain passwords’ dataset, 𝐼𝐼 will not ben-
efit from hacking datasets such as pseudonyms and
cannot create a request and send it to 𝐴𝑆 because it
does not know users’ passwords. Therefore, RAMHU
resists verifier attack meritoriously.
(xiv) RAMHU resists leakage attack
Proof 14: Suppose that 𝐼 listens to some exchanged
requests among 𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆, and 𝐴𝑆 and tries to find any
information that helps him/her to penetrate network
authentication such as sending an ID explicitly or
sending a passwordwithweak encryption. Exchanged
requests between RAMHU entities such as a pass-
word update request (𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖(𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑁𝐶1 ‖ 𝑁𝐶2 ‖ 𝑁𝐶3 ‖
𝑈𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑖 ‖ 𝑀𝑃
𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑖
‖ 𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑊𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑚𝑝 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑊𝑖 ‖
𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1)) show that 𝐼 does not receive any leaked
real information for users during transmission such
as 𝐼𝐷𝑠 and 𝑃𝑊𝑖 (all information is anonymous and
hidden) that could be useful in penetrating the HC
network. Therefore, RAMHU resists leakage attack
5.2. Experimental Security Analysis. To ensure that authenti-
cation schemes work correctly and are authenticated, these
schemes require a formal tool to detect the robustness of
users’ authentication in the network. We provide the pro-
posed scheme simulation using the AVISPA tool to verify our
scheme, whether safe or unsafe. Our simulations are based on
the AVISPA tool with the current version v.1.1 (13/02/2006)
available on the website in [58]. This tool has been widely
used and accepted by researchers in recent years [59, 60]. It
has been used to check security problems and ensure that
known attacks are not able to penetrate users’ authentication
information.
5.2.1. AVISPA Description. After designing any authenti-
cation protocol, this protocol should be checked and its
accuracy verified under a test model such as the Dolev-Yao
(dy) to analyse, trace, and detect the possibility of attack
theoretically. However, this analysis needs to be simulated
in a practical manner to detect errors and hidden traces of
the authentication protocol designer, statistics, and accurate
results, checking several techniques on the same protocol.
The AVISPA tool provides the features listed above as well
as the ease, robustness, and applicability of this tool to
implement authentication protocols [61].
The AVISPA tool is a push-button, testing/proofing
model and is based on the HLPSL language. This language
uses directives and expressive terms to represent security
procedures. It is integrated with four backends that are the
On-the-Fly Model-Checker (OFMC), the Constraint-Logic-
based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), the SAT-based Model-
Checker (SATMC), and Tree Automata based on Auto-
matic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols
(TA4SP) to perform the simulation in AVISPA. Each backend
gives the result of simulation analysis statistics that is different
from the other [58]. The SATMC and TA4SP backends
do not work with a security protocol that implements the
XOR gateway; therefore, we relied on the OFMC and CL-
AtSe backends to simulate RAMHU. To implement the
authentication protocol in AVISPA, this protocol should
be first written in HLPSL and then converts to the low-
level language. The latter is read directly by the backends,
which is an intermediate format (IF) by the hlpsl2if compiler.
Then, it converts to an output format (OF) to extract and
describe the result of analysis by one of four backends. The
result of the analysis accurately describes that the protocol
is safe or not safe with some statistical numbers. HLPSL
is modular and role-oriented. This language allows the
completion of authentication protocol procedures as well
as intruder actions. To represent authentication scenarios
and build simulation structures, HLPSL uses roles, including
basic roles such as clients and servers (clients, centralServer,
and attributesServer) and composition (session and envi-
ronment) roles that control the sequence of sending and
receiving actions between clients and servers. In addition,
communication channels between network entities are gov-
erned by the dy model. Many basic types are used in HLPSL
to represent variables, constants, and algorithms (symmet-
ric/asymmetric/hash) such as agent, public key, message,
text, nat, const, and hash func; in addition to some symbols
and terms that have been shown in Table 5, more details
are provided in [58]. The authentication protocol in AVISPA
depends on security features in the goal specification. Each
protocol contains a set of goals (authentication and secret)
in authenticating each party with the other. The goals in
secrecy of demonstrate that secrets are not exposed or hacked
to nonintended entities, while the goals in authentication on
demonstrate that strong authentication has been applied
between entities based on witness and request.
5.2.2. Proposed Scheme with AVISPA. In this section, we will
illustrate the simulation of RAMHU in the AVISPA tool
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Table 5: Some HLSPL’s symbols and statements.
Symbol Description
. Concatenation
{} 𝐾𝑝 Asymmetric encryption with public key
𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 Used to link the role with the intended entity
= | > Reaction transitions to relate event with act
/\ Conjunction
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙 𝑖𝑑 Goal identifier
𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 The goal of protecting the secret between entities permanently
𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑛 The goal of strong authentication between entities
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 What intruder knows about network
using the HLPSL language. Our scheme depends on three
core roles: clienti, centralServer, and attributesServer played
by 𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆, and 𝐴𝑆, respectively. In addition, it includes the
supporting roles such as session, environment, and goal spec-
ification section. Each role contains parameters, variables,
and local constants. Each basic role contains a transition
section that indicates the sequence of communication among
entities. Each supporting role contains a composition section
that indicates the binding of roles and sessions. Asymmetric
encryption has been implemented between scheme entities
(𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆, and 𝐴𝑆) during public key exchange (𝐾𝐶𝑝𝑢, 𝐾𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑢,
and 𝐾𝐴𝑆𝑝𝑢) to perform confidentiality. Moreover, mutual
authentication has been used to ensure the legitimacy of
related parties in the protocols of the proposed scheme (initial
setup, registration, login, and authentication). Moreover, it
uses nonces (𝑁𝑐, 𝑁𝑐𝑠, and 𝑁𝑎𝑠) and a timestamp (𝑇𝑆𝑐, 𝑇𝑆𝑐𝑠,
𝑇𝑆𝑎𝑠) to support the features of anonymity and freshness. Our
scheme accomplishes 10 secrecy goals and 6 authentication
goals as noted in the goal section in Figure 11.
The authentication process begins by sending requests
from clients to the server. Therefore, the 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 role includes
the start signal as shown in Figure 8. 𝐶𝑖 receives the start
signal and changes the state flag (state variable) from 0 to 1. It
replaces 𝑈𝐼𝐷 and𝑀𝐼𝐷 with 𝑈𝑃𝑐 and𝑀𝑃𝑐 and calculates the
timestamp (𝑇𝑆󸀠𝑐) and new nonce (𝑁
󸀠
𝑐) by the new() operation.
After that, it computes the signatures (𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1 and 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔2),
as well as the password hiding process as calculated in the
computation operation of the𝑇𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊 parameter. It encrypts
the registration and login request (𝑇𝑆󸀠𝑐, 𝑁
󸀠
𝑐 , 𝐺𝑀
󸀠, 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔
󸀠
1,
𝑈𝑃󸀠𝑐 , 𝑀𝑃
󸀠
𝑐 , 𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖, 𝑇𝑚𝑝 𝑃𝑊
󸀠, and 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔
󸀠
2) by the public key
(𝐾𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑢) to establish a reliable communication with 𝐶𝑆. 𝐶𝑖
sends the request to 𝐶𝑆 where the transmission process is
performed by the SND() operation. It achieves a set of secret
goals (𝑠𝑒𝑐1 to 𝑠𝑒𝑐6) with both 𝐶𝑆 and 𝐴𝑆; these secrets
have been only known and kept by the intended parties. For
instance in 𝑠𝑒𝑐1, 𝑈𝐼𝐷,𝑀𝐼𝐷, and 𝑃𝑊 have been known and
kept only to 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐴𝑆, while in 𝑠𝑒𝑐3𝐺𝑀 and 𝐶𝑀 have been
known and kept only to𝐶𝑖 and𝐶𝑆, since these parameters are
not transmitted directly during the transition of information
between network parties; for example, 𝑃𝑊 implicitly is in
the computation of 𝑇𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊 and 𝐶𝑀 is implicitly in 𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑔1.
𝐶𝑖 also achieves the goal of authentication using statement
(witness) with parameters (𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑆, 𝑐𝑖 𝑐𝑠 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ2, 𝑁𝑐𝑠, 𝑇𝑆𝑐).
Namely, 𝐶𝑖 is a witness that the security parameters (𝑁𝑐𝑠,
𝑇𝑆𝑐) are fresh and correct. 𝐶𝑆 uses a statement (request)
to validate parameters with the strong authentication goal
(𝑐𝑖 𝑐𝑠 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ2) specified in the goal section (Figure 12). 𝐶𝑖
receives the authentication response by the RCV () operation
sent from 𝐴𝑆 by 𝐶𝑆. Then, 𝐶𝑖 decrypts the response using its
private key to verify the security parameters. If all security
parameters are verified correctly, 𝐶𝑖 performs the mutual
authentication process securely.
As shown in Figure 9, 𝐶𝑆 receives a registration and
login request by the RCV () operation in state 0. It
decrypts the request with its private key and then checks
the parameters and signatures to accomplish secret and
authentication goals. CS changes the state signal from 0
to 1 and constructs an authentication request based on the
security parameters (𝑇𝑆󸀠𝑐𝑠, 𝑁
󸀠
𝑐𝑠, 𝑈𝑃𝑐𝑠, 𝑀𝑃𝑐𝑠, 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔3, and
𝑇𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊) and encrypts it by the public key of 𝐴𝑆. 𝐶𝑆
performs strong authentication with 𝐴𝑆 during witness (𝐶𝑆,
𝐴𝑆, 𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑠 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ4, 𝑇𝑆󸀠𝑐𝑠,𝑁
󸀠
𝑐𝑠) to accomplish the authentication
goal (𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑠 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ4) based on the timestamp and fresh nonce
and validated in 𝐴𝑆 by statement (request). In state 1, 𝐶𝑆
receives an authentication response from 𝐴𝑆 and checks the
security parameters after decryption with its private key.
It changes the state signal to 2 and then constructs the
authentication response to 𝐶𝑖. 𝐶𝑆 sends response with two
strong authentication goals (𝑐𝑠 𝑐𝑖 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ1 and 𝑐𝑠 𝑐𝑖 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ5)
based on the security parameters (𝑁𝑐, 𝑇𝑆𝑐𝑠, 𝑇𝑚𝑝𝑃𝑊, and
𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑖).
𝐴𝑆 receives the authentication request and decrypts it
with the private key as shown in Figure 10. It accomplishes
5 secret goals and accomplishes two authentication goals
(𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑠 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ4 and 𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑠 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ6) based on 𝑇𝑆󸀠𝑐𝑠,𝑁
󸀠
𝑐𝑠, and 𝑃𝑊
󸀠.
It constructs the authentication response and establishes
strong authentication when validating parameters (𝑇𝑆𝑎𝑠,𝑁
󸀠
𝑐𝑠,
and 𝑃𝑊󸀠) in 𝐶𝑆. Figure 11 displays the roles of session,
environment, and goal section. In the session role, a compo-
sition process has been performed for the three roles (𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,
𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑟V𝑒𝑟, and 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑟V𝑒𝑟). This role specifies the
transmit and receive channels in the dy model. In the envi-
ronment role, the security parameters, the goals specified in
the goal section, and the known information for the intruder
(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒) have been defined. In this role, one
or more sessions are composed. We tested our scheme with
sessions for replay, MITM, and impersonating attacks. We
assumed that an intruder (𝐼) creates a public key (𝑘𝑖) and
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Figure 8: Client role in HLPSL.
has knowledge of the public keys (𝑘𝐶𝑝𝑢, 𝑘𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑢, and 𝑘𝐴𝑆𝑝𝑢)
of legitimate entities in the network. The intruder attempts
to resend the registration/login or authentication requests
later, intercept/modify these requests, or impersonate the
participating entities using 𝑖 𝑐𝑖, 𝑖 𝑐𝑠, and 𝑖 𝑎𝑠 constants
rather than 𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑠, and 𝑎𝑠. The results section shows that
these attacks cannot penetrate the security goals in our
scheme.
5.2.3. Simulation Results. In this section, the simulation
results in the AVISPA tool are based on two backends (OFMC
and CL-AtSe). Figure 12 shows the simulation result with
the OFMC backend and Figure 13 displays the simulation
result with the CL-AtSe backend. From the results shown
in Figures 12 and 13, our scheme clearly and accurately
shows the SAFE result in the SUMMARY section, bounded
number of sessions in the DETAILS section, the goals of
the scheme achieved (as specified) in the GOAL section,
and statistical numbers such as time, number of nodes,
and analysed states in the STATISTICS section for both
figures. Based on these results, we note that our scheme
is capable of preventing passive and active attacks such as
replay, MITM, and impersonating. Thus, the goals of the
scheme in Figure 11 are achieved to prevent the violation
of legitimate user information in the network authentica-
tion.
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Figure 9: Central server role in HLPSL.
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Figure 10: Attributes server role in HLPSL.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we found that existing healthcare applications
were vulnerable toweak security against some known attacks.
Towards this end, we proposed a new robust authentication
protocol (RAMHU) to prevent internal, external, passive,
and active attacks. Our scheme uses multiple pseudonyms
for both users and medical centres to prevent the trans-
mission of real information in the authentication request
and a MAC address to prevent counterfeit devices from
connecting to the network. The lightweight encryption and
signature algorithms (as described in Section 3) are used
to ensure that RAMHU’s efficient interaction with user
requests is guaranteed. In addition, we provided formal
and informal security analysis to demonstrate the effective-
ness of RAMHU in repelling known attacks. The RAMHU
scheme provides high-level security that maintains authenti-
cation information for users against various attacks. Future
directions for furthering the development of this scheme are
as follows:
(1) RAMHU requires strong authorisation to support
patient data exchange after user authentication.
We need a mechanism that supports role-based
and attribute-based privileges (e.g., doctor, nurse,
patient, advisor, researcher, and emergency) to access
patients’ data on a data server (𝐷𝑆). We intend to
use authorisation policies with signatures to ensure
proper authorisation of access to the data repos-
itory
(2) Our scheme uses lightweight and efficient perform-
ance algorithms that, according to many researchers,
have shown that ECIES and PHOTON are efficient
encryption and signature algorithms, respectively.
We intend to evaluate RAMHU in terms of effi-
ciency and discovery of performance standards such
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Figure 11: Supporting roles in HLPSL.
as end-to-end request delay, throughput, and error
rate
(3) We intend to use the wireless sensor network (WSN)
to collect patients’ data and send it to 𝐷𝑆. However,
collecting and storing data in 𝐷𝑆 requires the use of
encryption and signature algorithms against known
attacks
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Figure 12: Simulation result using OFMC.
Figure 13: Simulation result using CL-AtSe.
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